Three rarities --
-- a “Hail Mary” pass that works,
-- a trial court order that makes news, and
-- a judge who takes the hit for a litigant --
-- all converge in Judge John D. Casey’s recent decision in De Marco v. De Marco, for the Suffolk Probate and Family Court, making it remarkable beyond its outcome.
Michael DeMarco asked Judge Casey to terminate his alimony obligation to Katherine DeMarco, under M.G.L., ch. 208, §49(f), the social security full retirement age provision of the Alimony Reform Act (eff. 3/1/12). The judge advised the parties at the start of trial that he believed the result to be foregone: that §49(f) applies to all cases, and therefore, DeMarco alimony would end. The attorneys adopted the court’s view and devised a surviving settlement agreement with a terminal lump sum payment, and the end of periodic alimony.
Then, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) decided to the contrary, in Chin v. Meriott and two companion cases, ruling that §49(f) applies prospectively only, to those alimony payors whose divorce judgments followed March 1, 2012. While it is fair to say that Judge Casey’s belief reflected a consensus view of the bench and bar at the time, the SJC proved it flawed. It is not the first time that an appellate court nixed a trial judge’s view of the law, and certainly won’t be the last. The law develops, accordingly.
What makes this case interesting is that:
The fact that the judge allowed the Rule 60 to negate a contract of the parties, as distinguished from a judgment that he had, himself, written, is substantively remarkable – and potentially dangerous – as attorney David H. Lee (disclosure: Mr. Lee is William M. Levine’s former longtime law partner) pointed out in the Lawyers Weekly piece. Certainly, it is a challenge to the policy of finality. It is also understandable that Judge Casey, always a gentleman, felt responsible for the harsh result to Ms. DeMarco.
This was no simple “mulligan”, but one with combined factors that we won’t likely see again soon.