“Did stated intent of the
order trump the its effect?”
In Young v. Young, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) vacated the trial court judgment that awarded variable alimony based on a fixed percentage of the husband’s gross pre-tax compensation, based in part on its conclusion that it crossed the Alimony Reform Act (ARA) (eff. 3.1.12):
…[B]ecause [the order] was intended to award the wife an amount of alimony that exceeds her need to maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the marriage. (Italics ours)
By focusing on the intent of the order, we can only infer that the court was addressing the judge’s rationale for the order, instead of the order itself. That election matters, because it raises two questions:
- If the trial judge explained herself differently, might the SJC have upheld the judgment?
- If the SJC looked at the order in its full ramification, would it have impacted the outcome?
The actual support award in Young was bi-lateral, rising and dropping with the husband’s income, a fact eclipsed by the court’s sharp focus on intent. Thus, while the trial judge may have focused her analysis of the parties’ rising station, her order actually provided downside protection for the husband, too.
Had the judge expressed an intent to protect the husband in the event of income decline and stressed it concomitantly with the potential for “upside”, might the “intent” infirmity that the SJC seized upon been neutralized? Or, if the judge had found that a family with roller coaster income might experience corresponding lifestyle flux?
After all, as the SJC observed:
There may also be special circumstances where an alimony award based on a percentage of the supporting spouse's income might not be an abuse of discretion, such as where the supporting spouse's income is highly variable from year to year, sometimes severely limiting his or her ability to pay, and where a percentage formula, averaged over time, is likely not to exceed the needs of the recipient spouse.
The SJC dealt with the former, but not the latter.