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Divorce Mediation Blog

A Prenup Head Shaker from the Appeals Court: Stacy v. Stacy

Wednesday, January 04, 2017

In a Rule 1:28 Memorandum and Order, a panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled that a pre-marital agreement applied to the death of a spouse, based on contract language that described its scope. Here is that term, fully as reported in the opinion, but broken down by clause:

    … a final and complete settlement of all matters relating to the interest and obligations of each [party] with respect to all future property matters, including but not limited to alimony, support, maintenance, property assignment, and the rights of the parties under G.L., c. 208, §34, as amended, in the event of divorce.

Yet, here is how the Appeals Court must have read it:

    … a final and complete settlement of all matters relating to the interest and obligations of each [party] with respect to all future property matters[.]

    [ ]

    [ ]

The appellate panel tossed out two of the three clauses, which spoke only of divorce, consigned as surplusage, unworthy of consideration, despite the “agreement’s caption referring to G.L., c. 208, §34”, the divorce property division statute.

Now,, let’s cast the provision in the way that is consistent with the maxim that words in a contract are to be accorded meaning within customary everyday usage, with the law of pre-marital agreements that requires that waivers be explicit and the highly probable intent of the parties:

    … a final and complete settlement of all matters relating to the interest and obligations of each [party] with respect to all future property matters, in the event of divorce [,] including but not limited to alimony, support, maintenance, property assignment, and the rights of the parties under G.L., c. 208, §34, as amended[.]

Do you think that the parties’ might have used the word “death” somewhere, if they intended to cover that contingency? Or “estate”? Bequest”? Maybe, “inheritance”? Even “survivor”?

The result is that a widow, with no hint of pending divorce, or even marital strain, must now answer to her sister-in-law (the estate’s personal representative) for “several furnishings and personal belongings” that she removed from her marital home, in part, for alleged violation of a premarital agreement that was to all appearances, extinguished by her husband’s death.

We have no quarrel with the Appeals Court remand on the grounds that a violation of G. L. c. 190B, § 3-709 may have occurred, or that the alleged facts were also sufficient to state claims of a conversion, an unjust enrichment, and a constructive trust. But the Appeals Court is makes unnecessary mischief by inferring intent that doesn’t appear in, or even between the lines of, the contract.



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